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Machiavelli’s People and Shakespeare’s Prophet: The Early Modern
Afterlife of Caius Martius Coriolanus

Niccolò Machiavelli and his Prince surface in many leadership studies that draw upon the
humanities. Il principe passes as an apology for early modern absolutism yet still prompts lively
discussions of modern government and political morality. Its model sovereign is imperious, often
cruel, and always controversial in the classroom. The book’s fifteenth chapter couples statements
expressing two sentiments responsible for Machiavelli’s reputation as rogue and realist. The first
advised princes to learn not to be good (imparare a potere non buono). Machiavelli conceded that
the illusion of being virtuous serves princes well, but dissembling and treachery are more reliable
ways to snatch and keep power. So much for the rogue; Machiavelli, the realist, was about
results. He prefaced his non buono with promises to steer clear of abstractions and imaginary
regimes. He is commonly said to have spawned political science by relying on the concrete,
stocking his counsel for sovereigns with examples extracted from antiquity and lessons learned
from contemporaries’ and from near neighbors’ mistakes and successes. He relied, that is, on
what was or had been done rather than on the hypothetical or hyped up. To show how (and
explain why) effects excused princes whom their tactics accused, he declared that he would go
directly to tangible truths (andare drieto alla verità effettuale della cosa).1
Despite his reputation for using the expected results or ends to justify princes’ meanness,
his counsel was more than a brief for cruelty. His less well known Discourses on Livy present a
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set of insightful reflections on leadership in republics. He turned to the early Roman republic to
illustrate the promise and peril of broadly participatory regimes. And one figure, Caius Martius
Coriolanus, whose notoriety owes more to Shakespeare than to Machiavelli, gave the latter a
chance to explain how effectively people could be mobilized to keep republican government
from capsizing.
But Coriolanus was and still is a controversial figure. Livy and Plutarch pieced together
from sources, now lost, his reputation for exceptional valor, especially during the siege and sack
of the city of Corioli. Caius Martius’s superior added “Coriolanus” to his name, commemorating
the victory and commending its principal architect. Patricians in Rome were delighted; plebeians
were not. As Caius Martius, Coriolanus opposed empowering them. As Coriolanus, he refused to
defer to them, and deference was necessary if, as patricians in the senate expected, their nominee
was to become one of Rome’s two consuls.
But Coriolanus’s disdain for commoners made them resentful. He was vilified, tried on
trumped up charges, nearly executed, and banished from Rome. As the story came to Livy and
Plutarch and, from them, to Machiavelli and Shakespeare, Coriolanus was moved by plebeian
ingratitude to join and lead Rome’s enemies to the very gates of the city he had served. Rome
was saved, in large part, by his mother’s pleas. But sparing those who had evicted him meant
betraying their (and his former) enemies who subsequently befriended and trusted him. They
repaid his betrayal and killed him.
Coriolanus’s fate would have made for just another interesting, generally unverifiable
story from archaic Rome, had interpreters not drawn from his misfortune different implications
for the conduct of leadership in a republic or for the virtue or viciousness of republican regimes.
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This paper juxtaposes two different interpretations--the first, Machiavelli’s, was written early in
the sixteenth century; the second, Shakespeare’s, nearly a century later--to discuss their reasons
for repossessing and redeploying Coriolanus. We want to consider how and why Machiavelli, the
early modern diplomat, sifted the origins of the Roman republic to underscore the importance of
developing adequate means to express ordinary citizens’ resentments and, thereby, to temper the
tyranny he sometimes seemed to sanction in his Prince. We also want to learn why Shakespeare,
the early modern dramatist, doubted the value of republican initiatives. Undiplomatic Coriolanus
was an antagonist in the diplomat’s Discorsi. His abrasiveness stirred popular opposition, which,
when properly channeled, demonstrated the effectiveness of the plebeians’ and of their tribunes’
discretion. But, as the playwright’s protagonist, Coriolanus was contemptuous of plebeians and
their tribunes. Coriolanus, the play, ends badly for him. But his contempt prompts us to discuss
dilemmas still facing leadership studies that assess relationships between leaders and the led in
republican governments. And his contempt will eventually tempt us to enroll him among other
disgraced yet discerning prophets in the history of political dissent.
*

*

*

*

Machiavelli hunted for tangible truths about republican Rome in Titus Livy’s history,
which circulated in the first century CE. It siphoned information from predecessors who relied
on legend and subsequently lost sources to rehearse what is now called the city’s “conflict of the
orders,” a struggle that supposedly attended the transition from regal to consular government in
the late sixth and early fifth centuries, BCE. Reportedly, at the time, plebeians and patricians
were at odds--the former extorting concessions from a senatorial elite. Livy and his sources,
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however, are now said to have exaggerated the plebeians’ influence and, “afflicted with
numerous anachronisms,” cannot be used to reconstruct the socioeconomic texture of archaic
Rome. As for “the conflict of the orders,” which Machiavelli considered essential for good
government, its extent and character during the first decades of the republic, are impossible to
determine with confidence. Some scholars suggest that Coriolanus was then confronting and
criticizing an assortment of near destitute urban artisans and tenant farmers, a diverse,
economically disadvantaged plebeian “front” that seceded or went on strike to acquire political
representation and a larger share of available wealth. But the apparent success of their efforts
may indicate that they were led by affluent landowners and citizen soldiers able to afford the
equipment necessary for military services and eager to check the patricians’ power.2 And, as
Emilio Gabba notices, ambiguities and inaccuracies not only skewed what Livy wrote about the
plebeians in the young republic but also affected the way his sources defined patricians. Gabba
thinks the “codification” of the Roman aristocracy occurred long after Coriolanus and the elites
would have encountered commoners’ agitation and their tribunes’ demands. Hence, historians
ought to approach all Roman sources for that stretch very cautiously, molto prudenti.3
Well into the twentieth century, however, most scholars accepted what Livy wrote about
the early republic as “highly reliable.”4 So we should not expect Machiavelli to have been unduly
skeptical. Besides, Livy’s story of Coriolanus’s insolence and of the plebeians’ reactions was too
good to be untrue, which is to say that it fit Machiavelli’s preconceptions and purposes. Livy had
retrieved the political tensions that led, through the Roman tribunes’ robust interventions, to the
city’s defensible verdict against Coriolanus--and to the restoration of order in Rome. In effect,
Livy substantiated Machiavelli’s claims that mistrust among the elites enabled commoners and
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their representatives to stabilize republican government. No wonder Machiavelli “made the
history of Titus Livy his Bible.”5
And that “bible” demonized Coriolanus. The context was significant. Livy explained
that quarrels between plebeians and patricians were resolved after Rome’s last king had been
deposed and when commoners were granted the right to select tribunes to protect their interests.
But crop failures in local fields, the arrival of corn from patricians’ Sicilian estates, and prices
charged by the patricians prompted Rome’s commoners to demand price controls. According to
Livy, Coriolanus proposed to use the crisis to cancel the concessions that, in his estimation, the
plebeians had extorted from the senate. If they wanted to return to the prices that pertained when
corn was plentiful, commoners, he submitted, must relinquish their newly acquired prerogatives
and return full authority to the patricians.6
Coriolanus’s blunt ultimatum and exploitation of the famine is thrown into greater relief
in Livy’s story by his description of another patrician’s tact and tactics; his Menenius Agrippa
reassured commoners that the patrician senate and moneyed interests it represented were vitally
concerned with plebeians’ wellbeing. The elites were comparable to a body’s belly, Menenius
explained; although more conspicuously industrious members of the body politic may suspect
that the stationary stomach was idle, it was not; the belly, much as Rome’s affluent elite, was
busy, wisely distributing nourishment. Livy mentions that the commoners were fond of
Menenius, however, his analogy was not an unqualified success. Plebeians’ anger somewhat
abated, yet they consented only to negotiations, the result of which were the concessions that
Coriolanus deplored.7
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Livy’s sympathies are with the commoners, and that obviously appealed to Machiavelli.
They had protested peacefully. They forced the senate to negotiate by leaving the city, settling
provisionally several miles away. They gave no other provocation, yet the suspense, Livy says,
was paralyzing. Plebeians, who had not “seceded” and were left in Rome, were frightened that
they might become targets of the city’s patricians. Plebeians and patricians alike were tormented
by the prospect that a Rome so divided, fear-filled, and, in effect, immobilized, might fall prey to
its enemies. The senate concluded that reconciliation was required for Rome’s defense. Historian
Christopher Mackay claims that the senate’s next steps--allowing commoners to elect tribunes-marked “the beginning of the corporate organization of the plebs as a kind of state within the
state.”8 But, as we learned, many of Mackay’s colleagues are unsure that sparring parties in
early fifth-century Rome should be identified with relatively homogenous “orders” or “states.”
Machiavelli, however, had no such reservations. He saw a new and desirable order emerging
from “the conflict of the orders” in archaic Rome. Livy seems to have been far less sanguine
about the new order, although Thomas Baier thinks he was disposed to award “ultimate
authority” to the vox populi, if commoners could achieve sufficient unanimity to speak
meaningfully with a single voice.9
Livy’s sympathies are not easy to locate. Janet Chaplin seems sensible maintaining that
his “distillation of history into exempla” was meant to chart “a way out” of the difficulties he and
his first readers were experiencing.10 Still, in his account of the emerging republic, Livy seems to
use Coriolanus as an example of how to anger commoners and create difficulties, giving
Machiavelli a chance to use Coriolanus as an occasion, not an example--an occasion to show
how well the early Roman republican government worked. Coriolanus, as we just discovered,
was unpopular for having proposed that grain be withheld until the plebeians were prepared to
6

give up the authority they and their tribunes had lately acquired. Predictably, the plebeians were
furious; had they rioted, Coriolanus would have been slaughtered, patricians would have taken
precautions for self-defense, partisans of both sides, driven by fear or indignation, would have
turned an incident into a feud, destabilizing Rome’s new republic.11 But tribunes, wasting no
time, Machiavelli emphasized, summoned Coriolanus to argue his case, answer objections, and
accept punishment. Unlike officials in the Republic of Florence, who provided their citizens no
forum in which to vent to their anger (sfogare), the tribunes in Rome found an effective way to
spare their city the turmoil suffered by Machiavelli’s.12
Livy’s Coriolanus was an exemplary soldier. He and a small squadron not only repelled a
Volscian attack but carried the battle to his enemies, capturing the city of Corioli--and capturing,
for Caius Martius, his cognomen.13 Later, during a crisis precipitated by the senate’s concessions
and brought to a boil by Coriolanus’s incivility, he was banished from Rome, joined the Volsces,
all but supplanted their commander, and led their troops to avenge their previous humiliation--at
his hands--and to settle his score against those who banished him.14 Neither Machiavelli nor Livy
appears to have been interested in the mechanics of the military maneuvers, yet both noticed that
Coriolanus shrewdly sought to intensify “the conflict of the orders” by plundering commoners’
properties in the countryside and leaving those of the patricians untouched. Machiavelli admired
the strategy. Commanders should sow dissension among enemies, he averred, coupling Hannibal
with Coriolanus, two adepts waging psychological as well as bloody wars.15 Coriolanus clearly
met Livy’s expectations that field commanders lead by example (pugnando quam adhortando);
belligerent action rather than talk inspired soldiers whose advance, in one of Livy’s stories, was
suddenly stalled by the death of a valued comrade.16 Livy’s Coriolanus--exceptional at action,
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excellent at soldiering--was an awkward talker, as he was in Petrarch’s sketch and would be in
Shakespeare’s tragedy, “a brilliant general lost in the tricks of politics.”17
That observation, as it applies to Petrarch’s Coriolanus, is Christopher Pelling’s, with
whom Machiavelli would have disagreed. The new regime in Rome, having expelled the city’s
king and just beginning to program an emerging republic, was neither tricky nor treacherous. It
was heading in the right direction. Two consuls were elected annually. Candidates were candid,
not deceptive. Leaders were virtuous and resourceful.18 When patricians threatened to deprive
the plebeians of their prerogatives--as Coriolanus did--tribunes protected both, and, doing so,
they preserved civility in the city as well as citizens’ rights. Machiavelli was heartened by the
results attributing everything good about Roman government to the plebeians’ discontent and
tribunes’ interventions.19 His enthusiasm was undiminished by what Livy and others reported
about the senate’s ability to frustrate tribunes during the fifth century.20 He saw no abyss open
between the plebeians and patricians in the immediate aftermath of Rome’s regal period. What
mattered to him was that tribunes had stopped Coriolanus’s bid to compel commoners to
surrender their political advantages and status and that tribunes continued determinedly to
preside over what John McCormick now imagines to have been a “procedurally formalized
popular discussion of and judgment over . . . the lives of the grandi.”21 Machiavelli admitted that
plebeians occasionally became overbearing, yet the greater danger, he continued, originated with
the patricians, whose youth looked for chances to reassert their caste’s political dominance. Even
parents acknowledged that their children often were “too savage,” nearly toppling the tribunate.
But the office had survived for centuries in Rome, and Machiavelli lamented that fifteenth-and
early sixteenth-century Florence had nothing comparable.22 Archaic Rome’s tribunes, agitating
“against ambition and insolence,” he claimed, constantly revived republican virtues.23
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Plebeians were ambitious, susceptible to temptations to improve their lot, economically
and politically, but, conceding as much, Machiavelli nevertheless trusted that they were a safer
bet than their patrician neighbors to be discerning and prudent.24 The early modern Venetians,
having deposited power with patricians, were less well governed than the Romans who handed
over considerable authority to the plebeians (nelle mani della plebe).25 They had discovered that
commoners were unlikely to be driven by a desire to dominate. Non essere dominati; liberation,
not domination was the plebeians’ foremost concern, and, for Machiavelli, that priority was the
factor that would keep the fabric of republics from being ripped by factions and greed.26 “The
people” proved more effective than princes. “The people” were possessed of greater virtù.27
When necessary, they asserted their authority, although never arrogantly (né mai dominò
superbamente).28 Coriolanus’s contempt for them, notwithstanding his exceptional and
exemplary lack of ambition, was enough to condemn him, to rally Livy’s and Petrarch’s
plebeians as well Machiavelli against him.29
Here, Machiavelli was staking out an anomalous, if not also an awkward, position. To be
sure, there was no sixteenth-century groundswell of opinion favoring Coriolanus, but Francesco
Guicciardini, for one, suggested political tensions were unhealthy, that governments galloped
toward disaster when influential theorists countenanced discord between the multitude and the
moguls. Laudare le disunione, to praise friction was ludicrous.30 Studying late medieval Italy,
Machiavelli probably agreed. He deplored the sectarian spirit among early modern patricians.31
The case can be made that he was hunting for a leader--in John Najemy’s terms, for a “redeemerreformer”--to reformulate laws and revive respect for republican virtù in Italy.32 Coriolanus was
as far as one could be from becoming a model for Machiavelli’s “messiah.”
*
9

*

*

*

Few if any adaptations or interpretations of Shakespeare’s Coriolanus cast the protagonist
as a redeemer or reformer. But the play’s plebeians and emergent Roman republicanism often get
good press. At best, Coriolanus comes across as morally ambiguous; at worst, a crude, impudent
bigot. Even when performances understate what social reformers consider the play’s reformist or
populist sympathies, Coriolanus is not credited as a perceptive critic.33 His criticism, however, is
relevant to Machiavelli’s trust in political tension. Could Shakespeare have known of it? He was
an avid reader, but Machiavelli’s Discorsi did not appear in English until 1663. Historians have
argued that “Machiavellian approaches” were influential during the decades before Shakespeare
composed Coriolanus, but the term “approaches” is usually not pinned to specific themes. After
his abortive coup, Robert Devereaux, earl of Essex, was associated with Machiavelli by enemies
who variously emphasized his belligerence, scurrility, and social radicalism, yet the accusations
leveled before and after his execution in 1601 cannot convincingly be connected with either
Machiavelli’s republican sentiments or Shakespeare’s play that was first performed seven or
eight years later.34 To the extent that Machiavelli’s fondness for early republican Rome was
“translated” in late Elizabethan and early Stuart England as a populist manifesto, playwrights
could have drawn on those “Machiavellian approaches” to buttress their briefs for commoners’
interests. Indeed, Shakespeare and Machiavelli have been paired as advocates of participatory
regimes, and the implication is that Coriolanus, the character, was an occasion for each to put
plebeian interests in a favorable light.35 To me, this coupling is ill-conceived.
Although literary historian Anne Barton proposes a populist interpretation of the play,
she still contends that Shakespeare’s Coriolanus repudiates Machiavelli’s positive spin on the
tension or “struggle” between patricians and plebeians.36 And she has good cause to say so, for
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the protagonist explicitly complains that “when two authorities are up, neither supreme” peace
and calm give way to conflict and confusion; plebeian “crows” “peck the [patrician] eagles”;
insults and partisan bickering replace serious deliberation. “General ignorance” turn political
conversations from “real necessities” to a scramble of trivial pursuits, which Coriolanus calls
“unstable slightness.”37
“General ignorance”? Machiavelli’s commoners are so shrewd that they are hardly ever
needed to deceive (quasi mai s’inganni).38 The political intelligence, ignorance, and shrewdness
of any population, of course, are eminently debatable. As one of Shakespeare’s characters in
Coriolanus says, “our virtues lie in the interpretation of the time,” and interpretations of the time,
even at that time, varied.39 Those in the streets responsible for the so-called “Arab Spring” have
been lionized as courageous, liberal paladins of political freedom and simultaneously vilified as
rabid Islamists and terrorists.40 Likewise in sixteenth-century England, the authorities disagreed
about commoner’s political intelligence, steadfastness, and virtue. Commoners’ competence was
an issue in the 1540s--and again in the 1570s--as the religiously reformed debated the role of the
laity in parish government. Tudor magistrates and ministers encountered lay refugees from the
Continent who were accustomed to broadly participatory parish regimes. They hired and fired
pastors. A few English church officials, including Archbishop Thomas Cranmer, were intrigued
by that arrangement, but their fascination with the polities of those “stranger churches” led to no
innovative, democratic practices.41 The English laity played a prominent part sustaining worship
services during Queen Elizabeth’s first years, after many Catholic priests were dismissed and
while diocesan authorities sought religiously reformed replacements, but lay lectors retired--as
ordered--as soon as replacements were found.42 The subject of popular participation resurfaced
thereafter at Cambridge, in discussions of church discipline. William Fulke introduced the idea
11

that all people affected by decisions ought to have some say in sifting them (quod omnes tangit,
ab omnibus debet), but that “ought” was unpopular among the influential.43
When Shakespeare was still in Stratford-Upon-Avon in the 1580s and into the 1590s,
when he was settling in London, discussions of popular participation in policy-making were
generally contained within discussions of church staffing and liturgy. What risks would attach if
congregational decisions required commoners’ consent?44 Would ordinary people recognize the
extraordinary gifts needed to manage colleagues and crises? Hugh Grady suggests Shakespeare’s
Roman plays, including Coriolanus, pondered the problems posed by putting “great” leaders “in
a popular political context.”45 Perhaps Livy and Plutarch sniffed around those issues as well. An
early Elizabethan admirer of the former, William Painter, thought that Livy had emphasized the
intolerance of the mob, which would have torn Coriolanus “in pieces,” had the tribunes not
intervened to save him.46
“Downe must the nobilitie goe”; Matthew Sutcliffe, dean of Exeter Cathedral, issued his
warning, predicting what would happen to “the great,” if government of the local churches were
entrusted to ordinary congregants. He evoked the disturbances on the Continent during the 1530s
that followed (and, he alleged, had been occasioned by) the religious radicals’ experiments with
participatory parish regimes. In 1590, when Sutcliffe published his warning, England’s elites had
some--but small--reason to fear the fate that, according to Painter, awaited Coriolanus, inasmuch
as at least one dissident, who wanted to cut the hedges that the landed gentry planted to enclose
arable land (keeping commoners and their livestock out), proposed “cutting down [the]
gentlemen” as well.47
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But Coriolanus is politically imprecise. Hugh Grady counts it as one of Shakespeare’s
two “world-weary” plays. It does not consider politics to be “an invigorating positive force,”
Grady says, yet he seems incorrect when he characterizes the play’s and playwright’s take on
archaic Rome’s and on early modern England’s politics as “amoral” rather than immoral. The
protagonist’s opposition to the early republic is, after all, near fanatical.48 Disingenuously,
tribunes shift the blame onto him. They may seem, at first, to be justified calling him selfabsorbed, “insolent, o’ercome with pride, ambitious past all thinking, self-loving.”49 But
playgoers know that Coriolanus was not after power. Nominated consul by the senate, he
nonetheless disdained its ritual celebration of his heroism. He left the senate’s chamber instead
of staying to hear his “nothings monstered” in a colleague’s speech.50 He lacked tact and charm
yet seemed genuinely humble. He only reluctantly agreed to display his wounds in the market to
rally popular support for the nomination then rapidly repented turning his scars into a sales pitch.
His mother and Menenius, his mentor, would have had him stoop to conquer--that is, to win the
plebeians’ affection--but he held that pose poorly and for only a short time.51 “Deficiencies” of
that sort have been tabulated by historian James Kuzner, who relates them to the play’s position
on political pageantry, specifically, to its protagonist’s objections to republican politics. Kuzner
and others underscore the obvious, that Coriolanus “stand[s] outside the social compact,” but
Kuzner most emphatically argues that Shakespeare has his man reject the “state’s controlling
fictions,” rituals, and rhetoric, because they, in effect, take away subjects’ voices even as they
pretend to take them seriously. Coriolanus will not conform to expectations. He will not be
“made meaningful.” “Acknowledged agency, of which the people seem so covetous,” says
Kuzner, is, for Coriolanus, inauthentic.52
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We cannot confidently infer what Shakespeare thought about personal authenticity from
his Coriolanus’s transparency and impetuosity. But we may say with certainty that protagonist
(and possibly the playwright) would not have endorsed Machiavelli’s classification of citizens’
street demonstrations and secession, which forced patricians’ concessions as bargaining tactics
that stabilized the government.53 In Shakespeare’s play, the tribunes did all the bargaining for
the people, inciting otherwise agreeable citizens to rebellion to increase the tribunes’ leverage
with the senate. Coriolanus as consul, they said, would make citizens “of no more voice than
dogs that are often beat for barking.”54 But, in effect, and certainly in the end, the tribunes, not
Coriolanus, steal the commoners’ voices. True, the latter regretted the senate’s concessions that
created the tribunes, but those tribunes, Brutus and Sicinius, take liberties with the protagonist’s
impatience with plebeians’ demands, turning it into something comprehensively misanthropic-and turning him into the people’s “fixed enemy.”55 Historian John Roe’s observation is on the
mark: Shakespeare’s Coriolanus “makes popular, conspiratorial Machiavels of the tribunes,
whereas Machiavelli sees them as men of principle, whose disinterested application of the law”
gets the new republic off to a good start.56
In Machiavelli’s narrative, Rome’s plebeians were ready to attack the recklessly candid
Coriolanus; the tribunes save him from them. In Coriolanus, Shakespeare’s tribunes, at first, call
a crowd to “bear him to th’ rock Tarpeian and from thence unto destruction cast him.”57 Reading
Plutarch’s account of the agitation that attended the creation of the Roman republic, Shakespeare
was acquainted with “seditious” tribunes.58 Furthermore, allegations of sedition were very much
in the air in early modern England and in the minds of two of the realm’s sovereigns. Elizabeth I
silenced statesmen in the Lower House of Parliament claiming to represent the concerns of “the
commonality” in the late 1570s and 1580s, trying to legislate a further reform of the established
14

church. Then and subsequently, the queen expressed her displeasure whenever her courtships
became subjects for parliamentary debate. King James I was hostile to members of Parliament
whose seemingly interminable debates were, in his estimation, stunts to avoid enacting what he
most desired, a more perfect union between his two kingdoms, England and Scotland. But before
we compare the tribunes’ management of the electorate in Coriolanus with the representatives of
“The Commons,” we should be alert to the imperfect character of representation in Parliament.
Local elites controlled the elections to the House of Commons. The possibilities for genuinely
participatory regimes almost exclusively aired in debates about parishioners’ prerogatives. So
“free consents”; “free elections,” historian Oliver Arnold suggests, were phrases that seldom if
ever could be applied to the Elizabethan and Jacobean parliamentary elections. Arnold may be
correct ranking Shakespeare among political radicals determined to speak out about commoners’
lack of voice. The playwright may well have expressed his displeasure in Coriolanus, suggesting
that Rome’s plebeians should “never have traded in their rebellion for representation,” as Arnold
indicates, but I think his simpler argument is more defensible--specifically, his judgment that
Shakespeare’s play displays its maker’s fears that “the representatives of the people might be
oppressive masters rather than guardians of liberty.”59 On stage, this certainly is Coriolanus’s
reading of the commoners’ masters and, I will suggest, it was prophetic.
But Machiavelli, for his part, was unworried about such potential popular usurpers. From
what he learned about the Roman republic, he concluded that, in hundreds of elections during its
hundreds of years, the citizens chose no more than four wicked tribunes or consuls. Shakespeare
approached the problem of representation from a different angle. He found that Rome’s tribunes
wickedly manipulated the plebeians, who were too trusting and easily gulled; Mikail Hörnquist
suggests that “the Rome of [Shakespeare’s] Coriolanus is an archaic state which still has a long
15

way to go before becoming the perfect republic Machiavelli speaks of in the Discourses.”60 His
Coriolanus berates the senate for having ever set the city on that course. His mother scolds him
for being “too absolute,” for criticizing concessions, and for failing to comprehend that “policy”
dictates compromises. His mentor Menenius agrees, adding that the protagonist’s “nature is too
noble for this world.”61 On both counts, nobility and intransigence, Coriolanus exhibited traits
that we tend to associate with prophets disenchanted with the reigning rituals and routines of
their time and place, because they failed to inspire virtue and justice. Prophets’ disaffiliation
means that they can never be at home in their homelands. Coriolanus comes to us dishonored,
disaffected, and nearly throttled after the first three acts of Shakespeare’s play, at which point,
having been banished, he leaves Rome for “a world elsewhere.”62
He does not vanish from the stage. The final two acts have him in the company of his
former enemies, the Volscians, leading them to the gates of Rome. But a delegation dissuades
him from attacking. His mother, wife, and young son shame him for having turned on the city
that turned on him. The tribunes wrongly and wickedly accuse him of ambition, and, although
his actions during the final acts could be construed as corroboration, neither Shakespeare nor
Plutarch would give Coriolanus’s self-interest and ambition much play.63 But, plausibly, the
playwright’s ambition and irritation with commoners got stage time in Coriolanus. Historian
Robert Ormsby imagines that dramatists who were also entrepreneurs may have been restless.
The success of a play and the fate of a theater company could depend on audiences that were
“comprised of the socially and mentally unfit whose judgments,” if we may trust literature that
was patently anti-theatrical, were “mutable and harmful.” Shakespeare’s Coriolanus, in the first
scene of the first act, echoes that estimate: “with every minute you do change your mind and call
him noble that was now your hate, him vile that was your garland.” Did the playwright rake into
16

his character’s contempt his own displeasure at having the whims of “the vulgar sort,” to some
extent, control his plays’ reception and profit margin?64
Stephen Greenblatt usefully reminds us that Shakespeare, whose investments were nearly
as dependent on the fickle, “vulgar [or common] sort” as on early modern aristocratic patronage,
was, unlike Machiavelli, a man whose leisure was gladly spent among commoners. Machiavelli
once wrote “with disgust of the vulgar arguments and stupid games he was forced to watch” after
he had been forcibly retired from the diplomatic service and “rusticated”; “his only relief came in
the evenings,” Greenblatt continues, drawing on the desolation expressed in one of Machiavelli’s
letters. At night, the Florentine would come alive in his library with “his beloved authors,” Livy
and others of that time. “[A]t last [Machiavelli] had companions fit for his intellect,” Greenblatt
imaginatively yet, I think, correctly editorializes, adding--also correctly--that “nothing could be
further from Shakespeare’s sensibility.” If the playwright ever “showed signs of boredom at the
small talk, trivial pursuits, and foolish games of ordinary people,” we do not know of it.65 Such
observations and “editorials” would seem to sabotage the interpretations on offer in this study,
although one can envision Shakespeare’s familiarity with pub culture breeding contempt for
commoners who presumed to exercise political leverage and--perhaps even more easily--see
Machiavelli’s purported “disgust” with “the vulgar” in rural Italy leading him to romanticize
citizens’ participation in the early Roman republic. On these matters, however, we traffic in
guesses rather than certainties.
But of one thing we can be sure. We know what some ordinary people, in Southwark,
just outside the Globe Theater, were talking about when Shakespeare contemplated Coriolanus.
Bits of evidence left by litigation tell us that, a few months before the play was first performed,
“common people and handicraftsmen” from the parish of St. Saviour (now Southwark Cathedral)
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sued to have a say during their vestrymen’s selection of churchwardens. Parishioners had asked
Parliament to inquire why representatives from the congregation were systematically excluded
from deliberations.66 Suits of this sort were rare. There are few traces of parishioner resistance
elsewhere.67 But the resistance at St. Saviour’s is a matter of record and would have been hard
for Shakespeare to have missed, even had he not set foot in the church, in which, at about that
time (1607), he buried his brother Edmund. For theater financier Philip Henslowe, one of the
playwright’s competitors, and actor Edward Alleyn were members of the vestry, voting funds
from “the parish stock” to cover costs incurred in the struggle against “the common people.”68
Those parishioners-turned-plaintiffs may have played no part in Shakespeare’s retrieval
of republican Rome’s plebeians. A vestry’s insistence that popular participation in deliberations
was “unprofitable and inconvenient” may have had nothing to do with a somewhat similar view
that Coriolanus expressed onstage.69 But, conceivably, both Shakespeare and the vestrymen at
the parish church of St. Saviour knew of the opinions expressed by Thomas Bilson, who, as the
bishop of Winchester, had authority over the vestry and the precincts around the Globe Theater.
Before the parishioners at St. Saviour sued for “voices” during deliberations, their bishop praised
the earliest Christian church’s authorities for having restrained commoners in their congregations
from “intermedl[ing]” with the selection of leaders. “The rashenesse and rudenesse of the many
[who] are often ledde rather with affection than with discretion” and their fondness for “faction
and flatterie” he maintained, disqualified them from having say or “sway” in personnel or policy
decisions.70 Bilson’s reservations were anticipated. “Factious practice,” Dudley Fenner claimed,
could be prevented. Leaders could be trusted to channel commoners’ concerns, and commoners
could be trusted to realize that their corruptible reason had to be trained to make accurate
assessments of the predicaments facing their congregations and their kingdom.71
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Selfless, trusted leaders training and representing self-aware and discerning commoners:
Shakespeare’s Coriolanus could not imagine that scene. Machiavelli did. Can we, knowing what
we know about the influence of faction and flattery? Researchers refer to “motivated reasoning”
to describe the ostensible suspension of political judgment that seems all too familiar as citizens
fit their perceptions to partisanship. Discussions of the accuracy of information and the wisdom
of policy are “suffused with antagonistic meanings that transform utilitarian policymaking into
occasions for symbolic status competition.” And this leads to what Dan Kahan calls a “neutrality
crisis.” Kahan writes about jurisprudence and judges’ impartiality yet applies what he says about
the latter to the “cognitive illiberalism” of ordinary citizens--to the electorate. Its leaders polarize
political conversation to retain the loyalties of followers who oblige by letting their leaders’ selfinterest determine their own.72 Coriolanus calls such commoners “fragments,” as we know, and
he decries their servility and changeability.73 As populist interpreters of the play say, the crowd
onstage is not always subservient. Individuals venture a word or few, momentarily expressing an
independent and generous judgment and challenging their tribunes to herd more effectively. But
they do, and the fragments in Coriolanus, inevitably fall back in line. Geoffrey Cohen reminds us
that “one of the most durable lessons in social psychology is the power of group influence,” and
groups or factions award a decisive “filtering role” to their partisan leaders. Ordinary citizens or
commoners are led to think that they are forming opinions, but they are only choosing sides, or,
to be precise, choosing the same side. Motivated reasoning is relentless.74
*

*

*

*

*

Machiavelli’s people, protected by their tribunes, defined and asserted their interests,
sustaining a tension between the elites and themselves, the populares, that safeguarded their
republic. Shakespeare’s prophet, Coriolanus, judges the people unfit, easily manipulated (or
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“motivated”). Machiavelli trusted that, unlike elites, ordinary citizens would never let faction
trump discretion. Shakespeare’s Coriolanus--and, conceivably, Shakespeare himself--foresaw
that they would. The early modern views just summarized are clearly at odds with each other,
although by no means clear cut. Kahan and Cohen, whom we just left, for example, seemed to
substantiate what might pass, albeit not without contestation, as a “Shakespearean” mistrust in
the independence as well as the intelligence of an electorate composed of ordinary citizens, but
that mistrust is packed in the play alongside the playwright’s criticisms of the plebeians’ leaders,
the tribunes, and their “too noble” yet “too absolute” critic, Coriolanus. Machiavelli’s people and
the tribunes are treated favorably, yet ferocious partisanship and conflict--rather than goodwill or
enduring consensus--preserved their republics.
Here, Shakespeare and Machiavelli have been introduced as proponents of competing
visions of the virtues and political liabilities associated with citizens’ deference and defiance.
What they advocated, as they repossessed Coriolanus--and the crisis his candor and contempt
precipitated--affords us an occasion not only to contextualize two influential reappropriations or
reinventions of early republican Rome but also to reflect on the challenges posed to leadership
and to leadership studies by the development of participatory regimes.
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